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1. Introduction and background 
Market-based measures (MBM) are cost-effective policy instruments that can provide industrial 
organizations with strong incentives to use up-to-date technological, operational and managerial 
practices in emission reduction (Buhaug et al., 2009; European Commission, 2013a). One of the 
most promising alternatives in MBM is the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) (Kageson, 2007; 
Miola et al., 2011). In the US, the trading programme of SO2 has been very successful 
(Klaassen, 1996). Since its initial launch in 2005, the European Union (EU) ETS has become by 
far the largest ETS in the world, now having around 12,000 installations and representing 45% 
of EU emissions of CO2 (Grubb, 2006; Wrake et al., 2012). However, there has been rather 
limited progress in emission reduction from international shipping (European Commission, 
2013b). Whereas numerous political and institutional factors could be blamed for such slow 
progress, certain important issues remain to be studied and evaluated concerning the ETS itself.  
An ETS involving the shipping industry can be either “open” or “closed”. In an open system, 
shipping companies can trade emission permits with other industries (e.g., electricity generation, 
manufacturing or agriculture), whereas in a closed ETS (or Maritime ETS, METS) shipping 
companies can only trade among themselves. In theory, the scale of an open/broader ETS is 
larger because it allows permits to be traded with other industries, which makes the ETS system 
more transparent and the allocation of permits among different industries more efficient.  In 
METS, an appropriate emission cap is hard to set up, because international shipping is growing 
fast, and associated CO2 emissions are estimated with a high degree of uncertainty (Kageson, 
2007). The cap has to be generous, since an excessively tight cap is very hard to change at a 
later stage, which could bring excessive pressure and cost to the shipping industry and may even 
limit the possibility of international trade (Luo, 2013). Such considerations would favor the 
choice of an open ETS. However, an METS also has its own advantages. It is more feasible to 
implement from a policy, institutional and economic perspective (Schmidt et al., 2004; Bosi & 
Ellis, 2005); it is relatively easy to target a given sector rather than the entire economy; and 
building technical capacity and data collecting are more manageable at a sectoral level. In 
summary, both broad and sector-specific mechanisms are being considered by regulators and 
government agencies, and no definite decision has yet been made.1 
In addition, these two types of ETS can have different impacts on the shipping industry. The 
shipping industry is not composed of homogeneous carriers. Different types of cargo are carried 
in specialized ships that have differing operational costs and energy efficiency. The market 
structure and conduct of companies also differ among the various shipping sectors. For 
example, it is generally perceived that, on average, in comparison with container ships, dry bulk 
ships are older, less expensive and less energy efficient. Bulk cargos tend to have a lower value 
per ton, and thus such ships generally sail slower compared to container ships. In terms of 
market structure, the container shipping market tends to be less competitive, due to high market 
concentration, and the existence of liner conferences and alliances (Cullinane & Khanna, 2000; 
Song & Panayides, 2002). These features will make each sector respond to the ETS differently, 
resulting in different impacts on international trade (Song & Panayides, 2008; 2012a; 2012b; 
Lam, 2011; 2013; Lam & Van de Voorde, 2011; Cristea et al., 2013). Despite this, few 
published studies have investigated such an important issue. 
Apparently, any proposed mechanism needs to be endorsed or supported by major stake-
holders.  Therefore, without a good assessment and clear understanding of the possible 
consequences, the different sectors of the shipping industry may not be able to reach a 
consensus, which could well delay the implementation of the proposed emission reduction 
schemes. Bosi and Ellis (2005) emphasized the need to carry out ex ante studies prior to the 
                                                          
 
1 For detailed and updated information related to mechanism design and choice, see for example 
UNFCCC’s reports at http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-lca/items/4488.php and OECD/IRA’s reports at 
http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/scaling-upmarketmechanisms.htm 
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formation of a mechanism, and ex post studies to monitor and evaluate subsequent progress. 
However, previous studies on emission reduction in international shipping have mostly focused 
on operations and technologies (Eyring et al., 2005; DNV , 2010), emission volume and cost 
simulation (Wang et al., 2007; Buhaug et al., 2009; Eide et al., 2009; 2011; Liao et al., 2010), or 
emission permit allocation mechanisms (Kling & Zhao, 2000; Haites, 2009; Hepburn et al., 
2006). Although a few studies have provided comprehensive evaluations of alternative policy 
instruments on emission reduction (CE Delft, Germanischer Lloyd, MARINTEK and Det 
Norske Veritas, 2006; Kageson, 2007; Eide et al., 2011), they have not analyzed the economic 
implications for the international shipping industry as a result of the ETS, nor the differential 
impacts on the various shipping sectors. The inception of the EU ETS in 2005 motivated a 
number of economic studies, such as on the carbon cost pass-through ratio and its effects on end 
products’ prices (Sijm et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2010), the effects on firms’ 
profitability and stock prices (Smale et al., 2006; Oberndorfer, 2009; Demailly & Quirion, 2006; 
Veith et al., 2009; Mo et al., 2012), alternative emission permit allocation methods (Bode, 2006) 
and geographic and country differences (Knight, 2011; Viguier et al., 2006). Although these 
studies provide rich insights into the EU ETS, they have mostly focused on one single sector 
(e.g., the power generation industry) without investigating the implications of an open vs. a 
closed scheme. The implications of differences across sectors within an industry have not been 
considered either. Therefore, these studies cannot provide direct guidance on the impacts of an 
ETS on the international shipping industry. 
In this paper, we investigate and benchmark two different ETS mechanisms for the international 
shipping industry, namely, an open ETS in comparison to a closed maritime only scheme 
(METS). The analytical solutions and model calibration results allow us to evaluate the 
effectiveness of ETSs in achieving emission reduction objectives. More importantly, the 
impacts of alternative ETSs on different shipping sectors, such as the container shipping sector 
and the dry bulk shipping sector, are identified and benchmarked. It is found that an ETS, 
whether open or closed, will decrease ship speed, carrier output and fuel consumption in both 
container and bulk shipping sectors, even in the presence of a “wind-fall” profit to shipping 
firms, and that the level of reduction has a positive relationship with the emission permit price. 
Shipping volume reduction due to an ETS will be more severe when shipping costs are higher, 
which gives shipping firms strong incentives to improve fuel efficiency. Under the METS, the 
emission reduction objective is predetermined and will not be altered by the trade of permits.  
An increase in permit price will have the same effect on shipping volume, shipping speed and 
fuel consumption as the open ETS. However, market structure under the METS will have more 
significant impacts than in the case of an open ETS. The degree of competition/collusiveness of 
one shipping sector (e.g. container or dry bulk) will only affect the sector’s own performance in 
an open ETS, but will affect other sectors in the case of an METS. Such an externality is due to 
the fact that competitiveness in each sector will affect market equilibrium, and thus the price of 
emission permits prevailing in both sectors. Our model calibration results confirm and quantify 
such effects, and predict that the container sector will buy emission permits from the dry bulk 
side under an METS.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and solves the market 
equilibrium without any ETS, which is then used as a benchmark case. Section 3 solves the 
equilibrium under an open ETS. Section 4 considers an METS for the container and bulk 
shipping sectors. Section 5 calibrates the analytical model with industry data to obtain practical 
managerial and policy insights. Section 6 provides concluding remarks and proposes future 
research.   
2. Economic model and benchmark case 
This study models the impacts of possible ETS schemes on two representative sectors in the 
international shipping industry, namely the dry bulk sector and the container shipping sector. 
The former has the largest volume shipped, whereas the latter has the fastest growth rate 
(UNCTAD, 2011). Our modeling results can hold if multiple sectors are considered. Focusing 
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on two sectors, however, will make the model mathematically tractable, and thus a clear 
intuition can be obtained with closed-form solutions. 
We consider the case where there are ଵܰ( ଶܰ) carriers providing homogenous container (bulk) 
shipping services in a particular shipping market (global or regional). The annual demands for 
container shipping and bulk shipping are independent from each other (not substitutable), which 
can be modeled with the following demand functions: 
(1) ௥ܲ ൌ ܽ௥ െ ܾ௥෍ݍ௥,௜
ேೝ
௜ୀଵ
 ݅ ൌ 1,… ௥ܰ and ௥ܰ ൒ 1 
where ݍ௥,௜ is carrier i’s annual output (ݎ ൌ 1 for container carrier;	ݎ ൌ 2 for bulk carrier), while 
௥ܲ is the market price of shipping in sector r. Define ݐ௥,௜ as the time for carrier i to complete a 
voyage. If the average distance per voyage is ܦ௥, and the average speed of a ship is ܵ௥,௜, we have 
ݐ௥,௜ ൌ ܦ௥/ܵ௥,௜. Assume that the number of days at sea in a year is ρ and that the ship capacity is 
Ur, then the total quantity of cargo that one ship can carry is ௥ܷ
ఘ
௧ೝ,೔ ൌ ௥ܷ
ఘௌೝ,೔
஽ೝ . From this, the 
total number of ships required for carrier i to move ݍ௥,௜ units of cargo can be written as   ௤ೝ,೔
௎ೝഐೄೝ,೔ವೝ
ൌ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ௎ೝఘௌೝ,೔. 
Generally, a carrier’s cost for one ship can be specified as the sum of the voyage cost and a 
fixed cost ߛ௥,௜, which does not change with speed. ߛ௥,௜ may include operating costs, periodic 
maintenance, cargo-handling costs, and capital costs (Stopford, 2009, p.225). It is assumed that 
ߛ௥ is exogenous, and is hereafter referred to as ship operation cost for short. 
Since the predominant part of a voyage cost is fuel cost, following Psaraftis et al. (2009) and 
Corbett et al. (2009) (Psaraftis et al., 2009; Corbett et al., 2009), fuel cost can be expressed as a 
cubic function of ship speed as specified in equation (2)2, where ߣ௥ is a coefficient representing 
a ship’s energy efficiency and ߟ is fuel price. 
(2)     ௥݂,௜ ൌ ߩߟߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ଷ  
The lower the value of ߣ௥ means the less fuel that is consumed by a ship for the same speed, 
hence the higher the energy efficiency. Assuming that a carrier maximizes its profit by choosing 
the shipping volume and cruising speed, the objective function of a carrier can be written as:  
(3) ܯܽݔ௤ೝ,೔,ௌೝ,೔ߨ௥,௜ ൌ ௥ܲݍ௥,௜ െ ሺ ௥݂,௜ ൅ ߛ௥ሻ
ݍ௥,௜ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥,௜ ߩ 
where ௥݂,௜+ߛ௥	 is the total cost per ship. The first order conditions (FOCs) are:  
(4.1) 
∂ߨ௥,௜
∂ݍ௥,௜ ൌ ܽ௥ െ 2ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜ െ ܾ௥෍ ݍ௥,௝
ேೝ
௝ஷ௜
െ ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜෍߲ݍ௥,௝߲ݍ௥,௜
ேೝ
௝ஷ௜
െ ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥,௜ ߩ ൣߩߟߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ൅ ߛ௥൧ ൌ 0 
(4.2) 
߲ߨ௥,௜
߲ܵ௥,௜ ൌ െ
ݍ௥,௜ܦ௥
௥ܷ ߩ ቈ2ߩߟߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ െ
ߛ௥
ܵ௥,௜ଶ ቉ ൌ 0 
 
                                                          
 
2 It is recognized that the cubic law between speed and fuel consumption only applies to a ship’s main 
engine, whereas auxiliary engine fuel consumption is independent of speed (Corbett et al., 2009). Thus, 
fuel costs for an auxiliary engine can be categorized into the fixed cost of a ship’s operation cost ߛ௥.  
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Referring to Brander and Zhang (1990; 1993), Fu et al. (2006), Oum and Fu (2007), Basso and 
Zhang (2008), we introduce a conduct parameter ߥ௥௜,௝ ൌ ∑ డ௤ೝ,ೕడ௤ೝ,೔
ேೝ௝ஷ௜ , 			െ1 ൑ ߥ௥௜,௝ ൑ ௥ܰ െ 1 into 
FOC (4.1), so that our model is applicable to a spectrum of competition games. This conduct 
parameter measures the level of competitiveness in the market. The more negative the ߥ௥௜,௝ is, 
the higher the level of competition is. Specifically, ߥ௥௜,௝ ൌ 0 corresponds to the Cournot 
competition; ߥ௥௜,௝ ൌ െ1 corresponds to the Bertrand competition; ߥ௥௜,௝ ൌ ௥ܰ െ 1 corresponds to 
perfect collusion among firms to maximize joint profit. It can be checked that the Hessian 
matrix for the profit maximization problem in equation (3) is negative definite, which satisfies 
the second order condition for profit maximization.  
Considering non-trivial cases only, we restrict the study to non-negative traffic volumes. 
Assuming firms are identical in each sector, it is sufficient to use qr and Sr to denote the quantity 
and shipping speed of each company, and use vr for the competitiveness. Then the equilibrium 
speed and quantity for a carrier can be solved: 
(5.1)                                   ሚܵ௥ ൌ ට ఊೝଶఘఎఒೝ
య ൐ 0 
(5.2)                                   ݍ෤௥ ൌ 	 ଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘఎఒೝఊೝ
మయ
ଶ௎ೝఘ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ  
By (5.1), the optimal speed is a function of ship operation cost and energy efficiency, as well as 
fuel price. It is clear that ship speed is lower if a ship has a lower operation cost, lower 
efficiency (higher ߣ௥), or  higher fuel price.  
The fuel consumption volume at equilibrium can be obtained as 
(5.3)   ܨ෨௥ ൌ ߩߣ௥ ሚܵ௥ଷ ௤෤ೝ஽ೝ௎ೝఘௌሚೝ ൌ
ඥଶఘఒೝఊೝమయ ஽ೝሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘఎఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ
ସ ඥఎమయ ௎ೝమఘమ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ
 
The non-negativity of shipping quantity ݍ෤௥ and fuel consumption ܨ෨௥ implies that 2ܽ௥ ௥ܷߩ ൐
3ܦ௥ඥ2ߩߟߣ௥ߛ௥ଶయ . In addition, the following comparative statics results can be obtained: 
(6)  ப௤෤ೝபఎ ൏ 0, 
ப௤෤ೝ
பఒೝ ൏ 0,
ப௤෤ೝ
ப஽ೝ ൏ 0,
ப௤෤ೝ
பఔೝ ൏ 0,
ப௤෤ೝ
ப௎ೝ ൐ 0,
ப௤෤ೝ
பఊೝ ൏ 0; 
பௌሚೝ
பఎ ൏ 0,  
பௌሚೝ
பఒೝ ൏ 0,
பௌሚೝ
பఊೝ ൐ 0;
பி෨ೝ
பఎ ൏ 0,
பி෨ೝ
பఔೝ ൏ 0. 
Interpretations of the above comparative statics are straightforward: When fuel price increases 
or the fuel efficiency is lower, carriers will reduce ship speed to save fuel, leading to lower total 
fuel consumption and traffic outputs. When ship operation cost increases, carriers increase ship 
speed to reduce the number of ships needed. When carriers are more collusive, they will reduce 
their deployed capacities so as to raise market price, which allows them to achieve higher profits 
― but shipping volume will be reduced.  
3. An open ETS 
Under an open ETS, carriers can trade emission permits with other industries. As international 
shipping only accounts for 2.7% of global CO2 emissions, including it in an open scheme such 
as the EU ETS should have minimal effect on the price of emission permits. Therefore, the price 
of an emission permit (߯) is assumed to be exogenous. In such a case, the ETS is equivalent to a 
uniform charge on emission, which can be a positive tax/charge (if carriers buy emission 
permits) or a negative subsidy (if carriers sell emission permits). Since there is a definite 
relationship between fuel consumption and gas emission, the ETS is equivalent to a tax/subsidy 
on fuel consumption. Reflecting common practices observed under existing ETSs, it is assumed 
that each carrier is pre-allocated a quota of free emission which is ߠ	(0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 100%) 
percentage of its fuel consumption prior to the ETS. The profit maximization problem of a firm 
is therefore defined as follows: 
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(7)            ܯܽݔ௤ೝ,೔,ௌೝ,೔ߨ௥,௜ ൌ ௥ܲݍ௥,௜ െ ሺ ௥݂,௜ ൅ ߛ௥ሻ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ െ ߯ሾߩߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ
௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ െ ߠܨ෨௥ሿ	 
Since the container and bulk shipping sectors trade emission permits under the open ETS 
separately, the solutions for these two sectors are independent. The outcomes of trade are 
determined by emission permit price χ and the target of emission reduction percentage ሺ1 െ ߠሻ. 
The FOCs for maximization problem (7) are: 
(8.1) பగೝ,೔ப௤ೝ,೔ ൌ ܽ௥ െ 2ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜ െ ܾ௥ ∑ ݍ௥,௝
ேೝ௝ஷ௜ െ ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜ ∑ డ௤ೝ,ೕడ௤ೝ,೔
ேೝ௝ஷ௜ െ ஽ೝ௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ ሾߩሺߟ ൅ ߯ሻߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ൅ ߛ௥ሿ ൌ 0 
(8.2)பగೝ,೔பௌೝ,೔ ൌ െ
௤ೝ,೔
௎ೝ	ఘ/஽ೝ ൤2	ߩሺߟ ൅ ߯ሻߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ െ
ఊೝ
ௌೝ,೔మ
൨ ൌ 0 
Similarly, imposing symmetry, the equilibrium quantity and speed for the two shipping sectors 
can be solved as 
(9.1)                                          ݍത௥ ൌ ଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘሺఎାఞሻఒೝఊೝ
మయ
ଶ௎ೝఘ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ  
(9.2)                                                ܵ௥̅ ൌ ට ఊೝଶఘሺఎାఞሻఒೝ
య ൐ 0 
and fuel consumption is  
(9.3)                                         ܨത௥ ൌ ඥଶఘఒೝఊೝ
మయ ஽ೝሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘሺఎାఞሻఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ
ସ ඥሺఎାఞሻమయ ௎ೝమఘమ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ
 
The non-negativity of ݍത௥ and ܨത௥ implies that 2ܽ௥ ௥ܷߩ ൐ 3ܦ௥ඥ2ߩሺߟ ൅ ߯ሻߣ௥ߛ௥ଶయ . Compared to 
the solutions in (5), it is observed that, under the open ETS, the equilibrium solutions in (9) are 
equivalent to adding the emission permit price ߯ to the fuel price ߟ. From (6), we know that 
∂ݍ෤௥/ ∂ߟ ൏ 0, ∂ ሚܵ௥/ ∂ߟ ൏ 0 and ∂ܨ෨௥/ ∂ߟ ൏ 0. Therefore, it is clear that under the open ETS, for 
any θ<1 and ߯ ൐ 0, the fuel consumption, traffic quantity and ship speed of the carriers will 
decrease.  
Note that the target emission reduction percentage ሺ1 െ ߠሻ does not affect the equilibrium fuel 
consumption volume, traffic quantity or speed (as ߠ does not enter the FOCs for optimization 
problem (7)). However, ߠ determines the trading behavior of the shipping industry with other 
sectors under the open ETS. Define ߠ௥ᇱ  as the ratio of fuel usage in the open ETS to that in the 
case of no ETS, i.e., 
(10)                              ߠ௥ᇱ ൌ ிതೝி෨ೝ ൌ ටሺ
ఎ
ఎାఞሻଶ
య ሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘሺఎାఞሻఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ
ሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘఎఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ ൏ 1 
When ߠ ൐ ߠ௥ᇱ , a carrier sells its emission permits to other sectors. When ߠ ൏ ߠ௥ᇱ , a carrier buys 
permits. ߠ௥ᇱ  is a decreasing function of ߯. That is, when the price of emission permits increases, 
carriers have a stronger incentive to reduce fuel usage and sell emission permits. Also, it is 
interesting to note that ߠ௥ᇱ  is not dependent on market competition indicator vr. This indicates 
that the market structure has no effects on the degree of emission abatement of the international 
shipping industry under the open ETS. This is a new finding not yet identified in previous 
studies.  
Due to the fact that most of the containerships are newer than dry bulk ships, it is generally 
believed that container ships are more expensive (larger γ) and fuel efficient (smaller λ) than dry 
bulk ships. If such a condition holds, it is possible to analyze the differential impacts of an open 
ETS on the two shipping sectors. Define the proportional reduction in output and speed as in 
(11.1) and (11.2) respectively: 
(11.1)                                                            ܴ௥ ൌ ௤෤ೝି௤തೝ௤෤ೝ  
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(11.2)                                                          ௥ܶ ൌ ௌሚೝିௌೝ̅ௌሚೝ  
Taking partial derivatives of ܴ௥ and θ୰ᇱ  w.r.t. γ୰ and λ୰, it can be shown that ∂R୰/ ∂γ୰ ൐ 0, ∂R୰/ ∂λ୰ ൐ 0,∂θ୰ᇱ / ∂γ୰ ൏ 0, and ∂θ୰ᇱ / ∂λ୰ ൏ 0. These comparative statics indicate that a higher 
ship operational cost (larger ߛ௥) and lower fuel efficiency (larger ߣ௥) can make carriers reduce 
proportionally more output and use less fuel. Thus, there are strong economic incentives for 
carriers to upgrade their fleets with more cost-effective ships, reduce ship operational costs and 
improve fuel efficiency. The differential impacts of an open ETS on the dry bulk and container 
sectors will be examined using numerical simulation, since it involves all the industry-specific 
parameter values for ܽ௥, ௥ܷ,ܦ௥ ,ߣ௥ ,ߛ௥. 
Interestingly, substituting (5.1) and (9.2) into (11.2) leads to ௥ܶ ൌ 1 െ ඥ݊/ሺߟ ൅ ߯ሻయ , which 
shows that ௥ܶ depends only on fuel price ߟ and permit price ߯. This implies that container ships 
and dry bulk ships will have the same proportional speed reduction.  
To examine the impacts of the permit price on the profit of shipping lines, substitute the values 
of ݍത௥, ܵ௥̅, ܨത௥ back into the profit function, and totally differentiate that with respect to (w.r.t.)	߯, 
we get: 
(12)ௗగഥೝ,೔ௗఞ ൌ
డగഥೝ,೔
డ௤ೝ,೔
డ௤ೝ,೔
డఞ ൅ ∑
డగഥೝ,೔
డ௤ೝ,ೕ
డ௤ೝ,ೕ
డఞ
ேೝ௝ஷ௜ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ஹ଴
൅ డగഥೝ,೔డௌೝ,೔
డௌೝ,೔
డఞᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ୀ଴
൅ డగഥೝ,೔డఞต
ஹ	௢௥ழ଴
 
ൌ ሺߥ௥ െ ௥ܰ ൅ 1ሻܾ௥ݍത௥ ߲ݍത௥߲߯ െ ሾߩߣ௥ܵ௥̅
ଷ ݍത௥ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥̅ߩ െ ߠܨ
෨௥ሿ 
Since 	ߥ௥ ൑ ௥ܰ െ 1and ݍത௥/߲߯ ൏ 0, the first expressionሺߥ௥ െ ௥ܰ ൅ 1ሻܾ௥ݍത௥ డ௤തೝడఞ  is non-negative. 
This can be regarded as a “freight market” effect. An increase in ߯ reduces each carrier’s output 
level ݍത௥ሺ߯ሻ, leading to a higher freight rate. This is similar to collusion among carriers aiming at 
reducing their outputs jointly and increasing their profits. The second term, െሾߩߣ௥ܵ௥̅ଷݍത௥ܦ௥/
ሺ ௥ܷܵ௥̅	ߩሻ െ ߠܨ෨௥ሿ, can be regarded as an “emission market” effect, which is negative when a 
shipping company buys permits and positive when a shipping company sells emission permits. 
The overall effect on a carrier’s profit depends on the relative strength of these two effects. If 
the demand for shipping service is elastic, or the price of the emission permit is high, the sign 
for ݀ߨത௥,௜/݀߯ will be positive.  
From (12), it is also clear that the impact on a carrier’s profit w.r.t. permit price depends on the 
initial emission permit quota, the carriers’ competition behavior, and the degree of competition 
as measured by the number of competing shipping firms (i.e., parameters ߠ, ߥ௥ and 	 ௥ܰ 
respectively). It can be further concluded that, in the case of perfect collusion among carriers 
(i.e., 	ߥ௥ ൌ ௥ܰ െ 1), shipping firms’ profits will decrease with χ and be lower than the 
benchmark case (without ETS) for any given ߠ. In the case of Bertrand competition among 
carriers (i.e.,	ߥ௥ ൌ െ1), shipping firms’ profits will always be higher than the benchmark case. 
In the case of Cournot competition (i.e.,	ߥ௥ ൌ 0), the change in a carrier’s profit will depend on 
the proportion of emission allowance allocated. If the initial allocation is small, so that ߠ ൏
2/ሺ ௥ܰ ൅ 1ሻ, shipping firms’ profits will decrease with χ as in the perfect collusion case. 
However, if the initial allocation is large, so that 	ߠ ൒ 2/ሺ ௥ܰ ൅ 1ሻ, shipping firms’ profits will 
increase. 3 
                                                          
 
3The profit function is convex in χ as  ௗమగഥೝ,೔ௗఞమ ൒ 0. 
ௗగഥೝ,೔
ௗఞ ቚఞୀ଴ is a monotonic increasing function in ߠ. 
ௗగഥೝ,೔
ௗఞ ቚఞୀ଴ ൐ ሺ൑ሻ0	 when ߠ ൐ ሺ൑ሻ
2ሺߥݎ൅1ሻ
ሺܰݎ൅1ሻ൅ߥݎ. For a perfect collusion case (	ߥ௥ ൌ ௥ܰ െ 1), we have 
ௗగഥೝ,೔
ௗఞ ቚఞୀ଴ ൑ 0 regardless of the value of ߠ. Then the profit will decrease when χ increases from zero. For 
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4. A maritime only ETS (METS) 
In the case of a METS, the price of emission permits is not exogenous. Instead, it is the result of 
emission permit trade between the container and bulk sectors. In order to investigate the effects 
of permit trading, we first derive the equilibrium condition with the target emission level at 
ߠܨ෨௥(θ<1) and trade not being allowed. The problem for each sector is to maximize their 
respective profit with an equality constraint:  
(13)ܯܽݔ௤ೝ,೔,ௌೝ,೔ߨ௥,௜ ൌ ௥ܲݍ௥,௜ െ ሺ ௥݂,௜ ൅ ߛ௥ሻ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ 
ݏ. ݐ. 						ߩߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ଷ
ݍ௥,௜ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥,௜ 	ߩ ൌ ߠܨ
෨௥ 
The Lagrangian function for this problem can be written as: 
(14)                       ܮథೝ,೔ ൌ ௥ܲݍ௥,௜ െ ሺ ௥݂,௜ ൅ ߛ௥ሻ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ െ ߶௥,௜ሾ	ߩߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ௤ೝ,೔஽ೝ
௎ೝௌೝ,೔	ఘ െ ߠܨ෨௥ሿ 
where ߶௥,௜ ൐ 0is the Lagrangian multiplier. The corresponding FOCs for the Lagrangian 
function (14) with respect to ݍ௥,௜,ܵ௥,௜ and ߶௥,௜ can be derived as: 
(15.1) 
∂ܮథೝ,೔
∂ݍ௥,௜ ൌ ܽ௥ െ 2ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜ െ ܾ௥෍ ݍ௥,௝
ேೝ
௝ஷ௜
െ ܾ௥ݍ௥,௜෍߲ݍ௥,௝߲ݍ௥,௜
ேೝ
௝ஷ௜
െ ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥,௜ ߩ ൣߩ൫ߟ ൅ ߶௥,௜൯ߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ൅ ߛ௥൧ ൌ 0 
(15.2) 
∂ܮథೝ,೔
∂ܵ௥,௜ ൌ െ
ݍ௥,௜ܦ௥
௥ܷ ߩ ቈ2ߩ ሺߟ ൅ ߶௥,௜ሻߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ െ
ߛ௥
ܵ௥,௜ଶ ቉ ൌ 0 
(15.3) 
∂ܮథೝ,೔
∂߶௥,௜ ൌ ߩߣ௥ܵ௥,௜
ଷ ݍ௥,௜ܦ௥
௥ܷܵ௥,௜ߩ െ ߠܨ
෨௥ ൌ 0 
Imposing symmetry on equations (15) we have the following important equation: 
(16)                                ߠܨ෨௥ ൌ
ඥଶఘఒೝఊೝమయ ஽ೝሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ටଶఘሺఎାథ෡ೝሻఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ
ସ ටሺఎାథ෡ೝሻమయ ௎ೝమఘమ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ
 
Parameter ߶෠௥ is the shadow price of emission permits, or the contribution to the profit of a 
shipping firm by relaxing the emission constraint by one unit, i.e. ௗగෝೝௗሺఏி෨ೝሻ ൌ ߶෠௥. Clearly, when 
߶෠ଵ≠߶෠ଶ, both sectors have an incentive to trade if it is allowed. The sector with higher ߶෠௥ will 
buy emission permits as long as the price is lower than its own shadow price. Any price ݄ 
between ߶෠ଵ and ߶෠ଶ will lead to a Pareto improvement for the two sectors compared to a case 
with no trading. In an efficient market, the trade of emission permits will continue until no 
sector has an incentive to trade, or until equilibrium is reached when the shadow prices of the 
two sectors are equal. Without loss of generality, assume ߶෠ଵ ൐ ߶෠ଶ and thefollowing conditions 
hold, where ᇞഥ  denotes the number of emission permits traded by each container carrier 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
the Bertrand case (	ߥ௥ ൌ െ1), we have  ௗగഥೝ,೔ௗఞ ቚఞୀ଴ ൒ 0 regardless of the value of ߠ. Thus the profit will 
increase strictly for positive χ. 
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(17.1) 
 
(17.2) 
ە
ۖۖ
۔
ۖۖ
ۓ
ߠܨ෤1 ൅ᇞഥൌ
ඥ2ߩߣ1ߛ123 ܦ1ሺ2ܽ1ܷ1ߩ െ 3ܦ1ට2ߩሺߟ൅ത݄ሻߣ1ߛ123 ሻ
4ඥሺߟ ൅ ݄ሻ23 ܷ12ߩ2ܾ1ሾሺܰ1 ൅ 1ሻ ൅ ߥ1ሿ
ߠܨ෤2 െ ܰ1 ᇞ
ഥ
ܰ2 ൌ
ඥ2ߩߣ2ߛ223 ܦ2ሺ2ܽ2ܷ2ߩ െ 3ܦ2ට2ߩሺߟ൅ത݄ሻߣ2ߛ223 ሻ
4ඥሺߟ ൅ ݄ሻ23 ܷ22ߩ2ܾ2ሾሺܰ2 ൅ 1ሻ ൅ ߥ2ሿ
 
If the equilibrium price in the emission trading market is ത݄, the traffic quantity, ship cruising 
speed and fuel consumption for the two sectors are, respectively: 
(18)   ݍො௥ ൌ ଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘሺఎା௛ഥሻఒೝఊೝమ
య
ଶ௎ೝఘ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ , መܵ௥ ൌ ට
ఊೝ
ଶఘሺఎା௛ഥሻఒೝ
య , ܨ෠௥ ൌ ඥଶఘఒೝఊೝమ
య ஽ೝሺଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘሺఎା௛ഥሻఒೝఊೝమయ ሻ
ସ ඥሺఎା௛ഥሻమయ ௎ೝమఘమ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿሻ
 
Equations (18) are similar to the equilibrium results in the open ETS case (equation 9), except 
that the exogenous permit price in (9) is replaced by the equilibrium permit trading price ത݄. This 
implies that the impact of the METS will have the same effects on the performance of the two 
sectors as the open ETS, provided that the emission trading prices in the two systems are the 
same.  
Intuitively, since the emission permit is a valuable resource (binding constraint), if the initial 
allocation of emission allowance is small, the shadow prices will be high, which will result in a 
high trading price. As shown in Figure 1(a), when the initial allocation increases from θ1 to θ2, 
the shadow prices of the two sectors decrease from the red curves to the black ones, because 
more permits are available. It is clear that a small initial allocation can push up the permit price.  
(a) Change of ത݄ with ߠ (ߠଵ ൏ ߠଶ) (b) Change of ത݄ with νଵ (ߥଵᇱᇱ ൏ ߥଵᇱ ) 
Figure 1:  Illustration of emission price change with θ and ࣇ૚ 
 
To see how market structure affects the emission trading price, with (5.3), equation (17.1) can 
be rearranged as ඥଶఘఒభఊభ
మయ ஽భ
ସ௎భమఘమ௕భሾሺேభାଵሻାఔభሿ ቈ
ቀଶ௔భ௎భఘିଷ஽భ ඥଶఘሺఎାథభሻఒభఊభమయ ቁ
ඥሺఎାథభሻమయ െ ߠ
ଶ௔భ௎భఘିଷ஽భ ඥଶఘఎఒభఊభమయ
ඥఎమయ ቉ ൌ
ᇞଵ. Thus, for any ᇞଵ൐ 0, ߶ଵ increases when ߥଵdecreases (see Figure 1(b)), and thus the 
resultant ത݄ is higher. Similarly, by rearranging (17.2), it can be proved that ߶ଶ and resultant ത݄ 
rise in ߥଶ.  
The effect of carrier competition can be interpreted as follows. For the sector buying emission 
permits, when carriers compete more intensively (as measured by a smaller ݒ௜), the emission 
permit will be traded at a higher price, as carriers are more aggressive in output expansion and 
thus require more emission permits. For the sector selling emission permits, increased market 
Modeling the impacts of alternative emission trading schemes on international shipping 
Wang, Fu and Luo 
9 
collusion and reduced output make any further output reduction costly (i.e. a higher shadow 
price). This of course pushes up the trading price in the market.  
Finally, comparing the results of the open ETS and METS, it is clear that their impacts on the 
shipping industry are the same only if the emission trading prices in these two schemes are 
equal to each other. Of course, the emission price χ is exogenous in an open ETS, whereas h is 
determined by the trades between shipping sectors as well as by the emission reduction target 1-
θ.   
5. Model calibration and simulation results 
In addition to the aforementioned analytical solutions, in this section we will calibrate the 
economic model so that the economic impacts of ETS on the shipping industry can be simulated 
and quantified. Real market data for the international shipping industry in year 2007 are adopted 
in the simulation. Average ship cruising speed and size are calculated using data from Buhaug et 
al. (2009, p.131). Container ships have an average speed of ሚܵଵ ൌ 23 kts (nautical miles per 
hour), while a dry bulk ship’s speed is ሚܵଶ ൌ 14 kts. The average ship size is ଵܷ ൌ 23,000 tons 
for a container ship, and ܷଶ ൌ 49,000 tons for a dry bulk ship. In addition, it is assumed that a 
ship sails 24 hours a day, and spends 270 days at sea per year or ߩ ൌ 270 ൈ 24 ൌ 6,480 hours 
(Buhaug et al., 2009). 
International seaborne traffic data is available from the Review of Maritime Transport 2008 
published by UNCTAD. In year 2007, the container sector carried 1,240	million tons of cargo, 
and the dry bulk sector carried 4,100	million tons. Based on the same data source, it can be 
calculated that the average freight rate for the container sector is ෨ܲଵ ൌ $180/ton for an average 
voyage distance of ܦଵ ൌ 9,036 nms (nautical miles).  It is not possible to precisely identify the 
average voyage distance for dry bulk shipping, so for benchmark purposes it is assumed to be 
the same as for container shipping. The ship bunker fuel price is around η=$350/ton ($ stands 
for US dollar) in year 2007 (Yao et al., 2012). The most widely used containership type is the 
Post Panamax, with a capacity of around 6,000 TEUs.4 Notteboom and Carriou (2009) 
estimated that a 6000-7000 TEUs containership burns 203.4 tons of bunker fuel  per day at its 
design speed of 25 kts, which is equivalent to 8.475 tons per hour. As a ship’s hourly fuel 
consumption is equal to ߣ௥ܵ௥,௜ଷ , the containership fuel efficiency is calculated as ߣଵ ൌ 0.000542. 
In terms of dry bulk ships, Chang and Chang (2013) estimated ߣଶ as 0.0012168 for a Panamax 
ship, which is the most widely used type of dry bulk ship.  
Dry bulk ships are mostly time-chartered on a trip or period basis, and freight rates fluctuate 
according to routes and time periods. In our study, ෨ܲଶ is set to be $48/ton, which is calculated 
based on the trip charter rate on the Brazil to China route for iron ore transport (UNCTAD, 
2008).  
Next we determine the number of firms in each sector. In the container sector, worldwide 
capacity shares of the top 15 operators in 2007 correspond to a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) of 995, equivalent to ଵܰ ൌ 10 symmetric firms competing in the market5. For the dry 
bulk market, it is assumed that there are ଶܰ ൌ 20 symmetric dry bulk carriers in the market. 
This corresponds to an HHI concentration ratio of 500, reflecting the industry reality that the 
bulk sector is more competitive than the container sector6. It should be noted that we are using 
                                                          
 
4 Average ship size has been increasing over the years due to the existence of economies of scale, 
although geographical implications also play an important role in carriers’ fleet choice (Cullinane & 
Khanna, 1999; 2000). Our model calibration reflects the status as of 2007. 
5 The 16th world’s largest container liner, Hamburg Sud, only had 1.55% of the world’s container capacity 
in year 2007. Such a small market share contributes little to the HHI index. Thus, only the top 15 
container liners are considered in our study, so as to reduce the complexity in data compilation. 
6 Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network database collected the fleet capacity (in DWT) for the world’s 
top 50 dry bulk ship owners in 2007. The 50th ranked ship owner, Alpha Tanker & Frt, has a very small 
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world aggregate carrier numbers, whereas in reality the firm number on a particular route must 
be smaller. With respect to market conduct parameter ߥ௥, it is assumed that ߥଵ ൌ 0.8 and ߥଶ ൌ0. This assumption reflects the fact that the container shipping market is fairly collusive due to 
high market concentration and influential alliances among major shipping lines, while the dry 
bulk market is more competitive.  
With the above assumptions, other parameters can be derived. By equation (5.1), a ship’s annual 
operation cost ߛ௥ can be obtained thus, that ߛଵ ൌ $2.99 ൈ 10଻ and ߛଶ ൌ $1.51 ൈ 10଻. Finally, 
with the estimated ߛ௥ and the following two equations (19) and (20), the unknown parameters in 
the demand function, the fuel consumption and carrier profit without ETS are derived and 
summarized in Table 1. 
 (19)                                                              ෨ܲ௥ ൌ ܽ௥ െ ܾ௥ ෨ܳ௥ 
 (20)                                           ொ෨ೝேೝ ൌ ݍ෤௥ ൌ
ଶ௔ೝ௎ೝఘିଷ஽ೝ ඥଶఘఎఒೝఊೝమయ
ଶ௎ೝఘ௕ೝሾሺேೝାଵሻାఔೝሿ  
Table 1:  Derived parameter values in the benchmark case  
Parameter  ܽଵ($/ton) ܽଶ($/ton) ܾଵ($/ton2) ܾଶ($/ton2) 
Value 522.92 84.42 2.77 ൈ 10ି଻ 8.88 ൈ 10ିଽ 
Parameter  ܨ෨ଵ ܨ෨ଶ ߨ෤ଵ ߨ෤ଶ	
Value 1.40 ൈ 10଻ 9.02 ൈ 10଺ 7.65 ൈ 10ଽ 3.66 ൈ 10଼
5.1 Model calibration for open ETS 
The analytical model suggests that under an open ETS, both the container and dry bulk sectors 
will have reduced speeds and outputs. This can be seen from the simulation result reported in 
Figure 2. The container and dry bulk sectors have the same proportional reduction in speed 
(Figure 2(a)). This is consistent with (11.2) because this proportion is dependent only on fuel 
price and emission permit price. However, as a container ship is faster, it will experience a 
larger absolute speed reduction. In terms of output, the dry bulk sector has a larger reduction 
proportionally (Figure 2(b)). This result is intuitive, because a dry bulk ship is much less fuel 
efficient, making it more sensitive to an effective increase in fuel price due to emission charges.  
An increase in permit price will have a different impact on fuel usage in an open ETS, as shown 
in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) depicts the ratio of fuel usage ߠ௥ᇱ  as derived in equation (10). It is clear 
that the container sector always uses more fuel than the dry bulk sector, indicating that it is more 
likely to buy permits than the dry bulk sector under an open ETS. It is also noted that the profits 
of dry bulk carriers are more significantly affected compared to container carriers under an open 
ETS (Figure 3(b)).     
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
fleet of 29 ships. If only the top 50 dry bulk carriers reported by Clarksons are considered, the 
corresponding HHI is around 400, which is equivalent to 25 symmetric competitors. However, among 
these top 50 dry bulk carriers, some are not actively involved in international seaborne trade, thus the 
effective number of international dry bulk carriers should be even smaller. The assumption of Nଶ ൌ 20 
should be a reasonable proxy. 
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(a) speed (b) output 
Figure 2:  Proportional reduction in ship speed and output with ࣑ 
 
 
 
Ratio of fuel usage w.r.t. ߯ under an open ETS Proportional profit change w.r.t. ߯ under an 
open ETS (ߠ ൌ 0.5ሻ 
Figure 3:  The impacts of permit price on the fuel usage ratio and profit change 
5.2 Model calibration for METS 
For the METS, with the calibrated parameters, shadow prices ߶෠௥ and resultant market clearance 
permit prices ത݄ can be simulated using equations (16) and (17). The simulation results are 
collated in Table 2. The initial allocation factor is set from 0.6 to 0.95, as too small a factor will 
result in too much reduction in international shipping output.7 The simulation results indicate 
that the container sector always has a higher shadow price (݅. ݁. , ߶෠ଵ ൐ ߶෠ଶ), and will thus 
purchase emission permits from the dry bulk sector. This is intuitive, since fuel is more valuable 
to the container sector, which has a much higher freight rate and employs more fuel efficient 
vessels. 
                                                          
 
7 Our calibration results suggest that when ߠ ൌ 0.5, the shipping volume will reduce by 30% for the dry 
bulk sector and 8% for the container sector. Such dramatic output reductions would impose a serious 
impact on international trade and economy, and is certainly unacceptable to the shipping industry.  
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Table 2:  Equilibrium of an METS for different values of ࣂ given ࣇ૚ ൌ ૙. ૡ and ࣇ૛ ൌ ૙ 
ߠ ത݄($/ton) ᇞഥ(ton) ߶෠ଵ($/ton) ߶෠ଶ($/ton) 
0.95 19.6 1.27 ൈ 10ହ 24.3 17.1 
0.90 41.3 2.53 ൈ 10ହ 51.5 35.7 
0.85 65.3 3.76 ൈ 10ହ 82.4 56.1 
0.80 92.0 4.99 ൈ 10ହ 117.6 78.6 
0.75 121.9 6.18 ൈ 10ହ 157.9 103.4 
0.70 155.6 7.35 ൈ 10ହ 204.7 130.9 
0.65 193.9 8.50 ൈ 10ହ 259.3 161.6 
0.60 237.7 9.61 ൈ 10ହ 323.9 196.0 
 
The impacts of initial quota allocation and market structure on equilibrium outcomes can be 
directly observed from numerical simulations too, and these are in line with the analytical 
results reported in Figure 1. As illustrated in Figure 4(a), the price of emission permit ത݄ 
increases is higher when the initial allocation factor is smaller. Figure 4(b) illustrates the effects 
of market competition. Clearance price ത݄ increases when the emission permit buyer market 
(container sector in the simulation) becomes more competitive (with a lower ߥଵ); and when the 
emission seller market (dry bulk sector) becomes more collusive (with a higher ߥଶ). In recent 
years, efforts have been made by some governments and international agencies to maintain the 
level of competition in the container shipping sector (Lau et al., 2013). Whereas such a trend 
usually leads to larger market outputs, our simulation results suggest that an METS may impose 
a counter effect, since ത݄ will increase as the container shipping market becomes more 
competitive. This again demonstrates the complexity involved in designing realistic industry 
policies. 
In addition, it is noted that the values of ߶෠௥, ᇞഥ  and ത݄ are very sensitive to the change in ߠ. A 
small reduction in permit allocation will result in a significant change to the market equilibrium 
of permit trading between the container and dry bulk sectors. Thus if an METS is chosen by the 
regulator, the value of ߠ should be carefully designed so as not to impose too dramatic an 
impact on shipping and international trade. 
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ߠ ൌ 0.8 and ߠ ൌ 0.75 different ν௜ when ߠ ൌ 0.8 
Figure 4:  Simulated change in permit price in an METS 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Emission trading schemes have been proposed in order to reduce CO2 emissions from the 
international shipping industry. However, despite the successful implementation of ETSs, such 
as the US SO2 program and the EU ETS in previous years, there has been rather limited progress 
in reducing CO2 emissions from the international shipping industry. Whereas numerous political 
and institutional factors might be blamed for such slow progress, certain important issues 
remain to be studied and evaluated concerning the ETS itself. An ETS involving the shipping 
industry can be either “open” or “closed”, and these would have differential impacts on the 
shipping industry. In addition, the shipping industry is not composed of homogeneous carriers. 
The market structure and company conduct also vary across different shipping sectors. 
Therefore, the ETSs under consideration would have differential impacts on the various 
shipping sectors, and thus differential effects on international trade.   
This study analyzes and benchmarks the economic implications of two alternative ETS 
mechanisms, namely, an open ETS compared with an METS. The analytical solutions suggest 
that an ETS, whether open or maritime only, will decrease ship speed, carrier outputs and fuel 
consumption for both the container and bulk sectors, even in the presence of a “wind-fall” profit 
to shipping firms. Under an open ETS, the emission reduction target is a non-binding constraint, 
since carriers can trade their permits with other industries. The dry bulk sector will be more 
significantly affected compared to the container sector in terms of a higher proportional output 
reduction and more emission permits sold (or fewer permits used). Under an METS, the 
emission reduction limit will definitely be reached, and the permit price becomes endogenously 
determined by the trading behavior and market structure of both the container and dry bulk 
sectors. Under an METS, the degree of competition in a sector will have spill-over effects on the 
other sector. Specifically, when the sector that sells (buys) permits is more collusive 
(competitive), the equilibrium permit price will rise. 
For the purpose of obtaining practical conclusions and managerial insights, the analytical model 
is calibrated using market data for the year 2007. In addition to validating the analytical 
conclusions, our simulations suggest that under an METS, container carriers will buy emission 
permits from the dry bulk side. The endogenous permit price will increase when the container 
(dry bulk) sector becomes more competitive (collusive). Therefore, it is difficult to predict the 
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net effects on traffic volume when policies promoting competition in the container shipping 
market are introduced at the same time as emission trading schemes.  
These analytical and calibration results probably explain why it has been so difficult to include 
the maritime sector in an ETS, whether it be an open scheme or a maritime only scheme. 
Although there is the possibility of “wind-fall” profits, the industry will suffer loss in both total 
cargo volume and operational efficiency (in terms of lower ship cruising speed) if an ETS is 
introduced. In addition, it is difficult even for the maritime industry itself to reach a consensus, 
since each shipping sector will experience differential impacts, and there may be spill-over 
effects across different markets. In addition, an ETS scheme could have interactive effects on 
other industrial policies affecting market competition. Therefore, there is still much uncertainty 
associated with the net effects of ETS schemes, although similar policies have been introduced 
in other industries. Our study reveals the complexity involved in maritime market analysis, and 
calls for comprehensive empirical investigations into policy design for this critically important 
industry.   
As economic analysis of market-based measures (MBM) to reduce shipping CO2 emissions has 
been scanty, our research provides timely insights for both regulators and industry practitioners 
to evaluate the effects of introducing an ETS into the various shipping sectors. It offers a 
framework to identify the moderating effects of market structure and competition between firms 
on emission reduction schemes, and emphasizes the importance of understanding the differential 
impacts of ETSs brought to individual sectors within an industry. Of course, our study is also 
subject to several limitations, which may be addressed in future research. First, shipping 
networks can change if an ETS is implemented regionally. Shipping firms might re-configure 
routes to avoid emission charges. Second, shipping demand can be uncertain, due to external 
economic shocks. A stochastic demand specification may be more realistic, which could lead to 
different choices of emission reduction targets. These investigations are natural extensions of 
our study, although beyond the scope of the present paper.   
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